In Algeria, hardly any move directed at Morocco in the context of the "cold war" that has been raging between the two countries for about 7 years is detached from a media discourse marketed as a "new victory" recorded in the annals of victories for the duo Abdelmadjid Tebboune, President of the Republic, and Said Chengriha, Chief of Staff of the Army, who have made the Kingdom the "classic enemy," according to what is circulated at the official and media level.
This Algerian discourse, primarily aimed at internal consumption, in a broader context related to the attempt to control the street and avoid repeating the scenario of the "2019 Hirak," is met in Morocco, at the official level, with the policy of the "outstretched hand" enshrined by King Mohammed VI in several speeches, which also turns into an internal and external media discourse portraying Rabat as leaning more towards "calm and balance."
However, in practice, the official diplomatic discourse does not mean that the Kingdom does not possess leverage, which it plays from time to time in confronting its eastern neighbor, and through which it responds to steps that harm its political and economic interests, until it has gradually accumulated a kind of "silent siege" that Morocco does not talk about and Algeria cannot reveal its true damages.
Dams on the border
Days before the first round of negotiations on the Sahara issue, sponsored by the United States of America, to implement UN Security Council Resolution 2797 on the Sahara, which calls on all "parties" to negotiate on the basis of the Moroccan proposal for self-governance, the Algerian army moved into a small area called "Qasr Ish," located in an undemarcated border region between Morocco and Algeria. It is inhabited by dozens of Moroccan citizens who have been practicing subsistence farming there for decades.
Algerian media promoted a narrative that the Algerian army moved based on the 1972 border demarcation agreement, in order to reclaim a part of Algerian territory. Regardless of the fact that the agreement has not been implemented at all, the entire operation was a "show of force" against unarmed villagers, culminating in firing shots in the air and burning houses, to complete the scene of "victory" before the local media.
On the other hand, Morocco did not respond officially. Even the conversation between the local authorities of the Figuig province and the affected people to clarify what was happening was verbal, without any declared interaction or written commitment. However, days later, and without preamble, the "Khenk Gro" dam project, the fifth largest dam in the Kingdom, with a storage capacity exceeding one billion cubic meters, returned to the forefront. The Ministry of Equipment and Water confirmed that its completion will be in 2027.
This project is not new; work has been ongoing since 2024 with investments reaching 1.2 billion dirhams. However, what is new is that it has reached a construction progress of 60 percent, as well as the completion of 16 small dams in the Draa-Tafilalet region and 14 similar dams in the Eastern region. Both of these are border regions with Algeria. It is noteworthy that Algeria relies heavily on water coming from the Moroccan "Ksar Ziz Ghriss" basin, which includes the Figuig province, to ensure its water security.
The reflection of this could be catastrophic for Algeria, not only regarding water supply, in light of the suffering of the western and northern provinces from a dam drought crisis, such as the Bakhta Dam in the province of Tiaret, which experienced social protests due to water قطع in 2024, but also economically, given that mining operations in "Gara Djebilet" require enormous amounts of water to extract iron, which the state will have to secure from the northern provinces at additional costs in light of the vague profitability of the project as a whole.
This water battle has been waged by Morocco in silence for years, and its features became clear with the operation of the Guedoussa Dam in 2021, with a capacity of 220 million cubic meters, which is one-fifth of the total capacity of the new Figuig Dam. However, its impact was significant on the "Oued Zouzfana" facility, the fourth largest dam in Algeria, to the extent that the Algerian Minister of Water Resources, Taha Derbal, publicly expressed his anger in statements dating back to 2024, about "a neighboring country violating the environmental balance," as he described it.
A Port on the Neighbors' Doorstep
Always on the Algerian borders, this time maritime, Morocco is engaged in another economic battle in which it appears overwhelmingly superior to its neighbors. This concerns the establishment of the Nador West Med port, which King Mohammed VI officially decided to inaugurate before the end of 2026, in a location not far from the shores of Saidia, where a group of young Moroccans were enjoying their day one summer not long ago before Algerian soldiers shot at them after their jet skis inadvertently crossed the border line.
The issue of ports represents a historical burden for Algeria in front of Morocco, to the extent that when it decided at the beginning of 2024 to ban the entry of foreign goods shipped through Moroccan ports, especially the Tangier Med port, it reversed those restrictions a few days later due to the high cost. At the same time, the authorities were preparing to deliver the final blow to the promised "El Hamdania Port" project.
The "El Hamdania" port in Cherchell has been presented for 10 years by Algerian officials and local media as a "blow" to the Tangier Med port. However, by mid-2025, its chapter will be officially closed by a decision from President Abdelmadjid Tebboune, with investments redirected to develop existing port infrastructure, handing over the management to the French group CMA CGM, specializing in maritime shipping and containers, owned by the French-Lebanese businessman Rodolphe Saadé, known for his closeness to French President Emmanuel Macron.
Months later, specifically on January 28, 2026, King Mohammed VI will preside over a working meeting at the Royal Palace in Casablanca, dedicated to the new Nador West Med port and industrial complex, located a stone's throw from the Algerian border. This is in anticipation of the operational launch of this port during the last quarter of this year, as announced by the Royal Court.
This project explicitly means Morocco tightening its grip on the western entrance of the Mediterranean basin. It concerns a new generation port complex, enhanced by a vast industrial, logistical, and energy platform, which has attracted public and private investments totaling 51 billion dirhams, more than the maximum investments Algeria intended to gather for the El Hamdania port, estimated at between 3 and 5 billion dollars.
This port's friction with Algeria's interests is more evident through its energy hub, which will house the Kingdom's first LNG terminal, with an annual capacity of 5 billion cubic meters, in addition to a fuel terminal, in order to "respond to the Kingdom's energy sovereignty." Furthermore, its annual capacity will start with 5 million containers and will reach 12 million in the long term.
Self-determination... from South to North
Morocco's cards in its confrontation with Algeria, away from the spotlight, are not limited to the economic aspect only, but also extend to the diplomatic one. In this context, Rabat has gradually managed to pass the hot potato of the secessionist issue, from the Sahara in its southern territories, to the Kabylie region north of Algerian territories overlooking the Mediterranean basin.
On December 14, 2025, Ferhat Mehenni, president of the MAK movement for the self-determination of Kabylie, announced the "establishment of the Republic" from the French capital, Paris, which hosts the headquarters of the "government-in-exile," after he had written to the Security Council, in January of the same year, in the person of its then-rotating president, Algerian Ambassador Amar Bendjama, to include the Kabylie people's right to self-determination on the UN agenda.
On the official institutional level, Morocco does not recognize the so-called "Republic of Kabylie," nor does it support the region's secession from Algerian territory. However, this card remained in the drawer of its representation at the United Nations in New York for years, before it began to be used periodically in the context of "besieging" Algeria's desperate defense of what it considers "the right to self-determination" in the Sahara.
Este asunto surgió en 2021, cuando el Embajador Representante Permanente de Marruecos ante las Naciones Unidas se dirigió al entonces Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores argelino, Ramtane Lamamra, diciendo que este último "se erige como un firme defensor del derecho a la autodeterminación, pero niega el mismo derecho al pueblo de Cabilia, uno de los pueblos más antiguos de África, que sufre la ocupación extranjera más larga, según sus palabras, y continuó diciendo que 'la autodeterminación no es un principio caprichoso, y por eso el valiente pueblo de Cabilia merece, más que ningún otro pueblo, disfrutar plenamente del derecho a la autodeterminación'".
En 2022, Hilal volvió a plantear el asunto, en respuesta al entonces Embajador de Argelia ante las Naciones Unidas, Nadir Larbaoui, diciendo: "Ustedes exigen la autodeterminación para 20.000 personas que retienen en los campamentos de Tinduf, pero confiscan el derecho de una población de 12 millones de personas", y añadió: "El pueblo de Cabilia ha sido sometido a la colonización otomana, luego francesa y ahora argelina", lamentando que se trate de la ocupación más larga de la historia de África, y preguntó: "¿Por qué Argelia no permite al pueblo de Cabilia autodeterminarse, expresarse y elegir libremente su destino, de manera similar a lo que exigen para los habitantes de los campamentos de Tinduf?".
Esta alusión marroquí al asunto de Cabilia desde dentro de las Naciones Unidas se ha convertido gradualmente en un dolor de cabeza para las autoridades argelinas, especialmente después de la difusión del anuncio de la fundación del "Estado Cabileño" a través de instituciones mediáticas internacionales, mientras que el movimiento "MAK" amenaza con llevar el caso ante el Cuarto Comité de la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas, considerando que se trata de una cuestión de "descolonización".
